Tort And Fraud Claims Fall Within Arbitration Agreement: Ontario Court Of Appeal

In Haas v. Gunasekaram, 2016 ONCA 744, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently held that claims in tort and fraud, and resulting claims to set aside the agreement between the parties, were within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under an arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the court action between the parties was stayed.

This decision is important due to the pro-arbitration principles of contractual interpretation which the Court of Appeal adopted, and due to its finding that the claims in tort and fraud – which are often found to fall outside arbitration clauses – were properly within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

Background

The four parties to the actions were shareholders in a company which started a restaurant. They entered into a shareholders agreement which contained an arbitration clause. The arbitration clause read as follows:

If at any time during the currency of this Agreement, or after the termination hereof, any dispute, difference or question shall arise, or any failure to agree as specifically hereinabove referred to, shall occur among the parties hereto or certain of them, respecting this Agreement or anything herein contained then every such dispute, difference or question or failure to agree shall be referred to a single arbitrator to be appointed by the parties to the dispute within ten (10) days of such referral… [underlining added.]

The restaurant failed and Mr. Haas brought an action against the other three shareholders claiming that he had been induced to enter into the shareholders’ agreement by fraudulent misrepresentations. The defendants brought a motion to stay the action, submitting that the claim must be dealt by way of arbitration. The judge hearing the motion dismissed it on the ground that Mr. Haas’ claims fell outside the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

Decision of the Court of Appeal

The decision of the Court of Appeal contains the following elements:

  1. A broad interpretation should be given to the arbitration agreement. The court said:

    “The law favours giving effect to arbitration agreements. This is evident in both legislation and in jurisprudence……the statutory language in s. 7 of the current Arbitration Act is directory, not equivocal. It strongly favours giving effect to an arbitration agreement. This policy direction is reinforced by s. 17 of the Arbitration Act [which authorizes the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction]….. The same pro-arbitration orientation is found in the jurisprudence….  It is now well-established in Ontario that the court should grant a stay under art. 8(1) of the Model Law where it is ‘arguable’ that the dispute falls within the terms of an arbitration agreement…. [quoting from the decision in Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Ltd. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 39-40]: ‘Only where it is clear that the dispute is outside the terms of the arbitration agreement or that a party is not a party to the arbitration agreement or that the application is out of time should the court reach any final determination in respect of such matters on an application for a stay of proceedings….Where it is arguable that the dispute falls within the terms of the arbitration agreement or where it is arguable that a party to the legal proceedings is a party to the arbitration agreement then, in my view, the stay should be granted and those matters left to be determined by the arbitral tribunal….’a deferential approach’ allowing the arbitrator to decide whether the dispute is arbitrable, absent a clear case to the contrary, ‘is consistent both with the wording of the legislation and the intention of the parties to review their disputes to arbitration.’”

  2. The court’s review of the misrepresentations alleged by Mr. Haas showed that they largely related to the defendants’ failure to perform their obligations under the shareholders’ agreement. There was only one alleged misrepresentation relating to conduct before the shareholders’ agreement, that the proposed location had a proven track record of successful restaurants. To establish his case, Mr. Haas would be relying on the contractual documents.
  3. The court considered that the arbitration agreement was “broad in scope.” It particularly referred to the words “if any dispute, difference or question shall arise, or any failure to agree as specifically hereinabove referred to, shall occur among the parties hereto or certain of them, respecting this Agreement or anything herein contained.”
  4. The court held that tort claims do not automatically fall outside an arbitration agreement. As long as “either claimant or defendant relies on the existence of a contractual obligation as a necessary element to create the claim, or to defeat it” or “the matter in dispute is referable to theinterpretation or implementation of some provision of the Agreement” or “the claim …relie[s] upon a breach of the contract as the source of the unlawfulness to ground” the claim, then a broadly based arbitration agreement applies. The court also echoed the caution cited in other cases that the court should “be wary of cases in which a party to an arbitration agreement seeks to avoid it by pleading a common law tort”
  5. The court also held that the plaintiff’s claim that fraud vitiated the agreement between the parties did not mean that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction. It just meant that the tribunal had the authority to decide that issue under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1991. That section enacts the competence-competence principle, namely that the arbitral tribunal has authority to decide its jurisdictional competence. In conclusion, the court said:

    “Put simply, in cases involving arbitration agreements, fraud does not necessarily vitiate everything. It is a matter of interpretation. The arbitration agreement in this case contains broad language, referring to “any dispute, difference or question…or any failure to agree…respecting this Agreement or anything herein contained then every such dispute, difference or question or failure to agree shall be referred to a single arbitrator. There is no exclusion for tort claims, misrepresentation or fraud.”

Discussion

The Court of Appeal’s finding that the arbitration agreement was a “broad” one is useful to those relying on arbitration agreements. The court might have taken a different view. The word “arise” is not as broad as, say, “relating to”, and the words “respecting this Agreement or anything herein contained” could arguably limit the arbitration to contractual disputes, and nothing more. Nevertheless, the court held that these words established a “broad” arbitration clause.

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that tort and fraud claims fall within the arbitration clause – at least to the extent of the arbitral tribunal’s entitlement to first determine whether they do – is very significant. This decision effectively over-rules or calls into question prior lower court decisions that, in less arbitration-friendly days, held to the contrary.

The key to the decision is, of course, the competence-competence principle. Once the tort and fraud claims arguably fall within the arbitration agreement, then the court must allow the arbitral tribunal to first decide whether they do or not. At that point, the court’s work is done, until the tribunal makes a decision on that issue which is brought back to the court for review. It is the direction of the legislature in section 17 of the Act – adopting the competence-competence principle –and the obligation of the court to apply that principle that results in the modern “hands off” attitude of courts toward arbitration. That attitude is one of the defining elements of the modern law of arbitration.

See Heintzman and Goldsmith on Canadian Building Contracts, 5th ed., chapter 11, parts 7 and 8.
Haas v. Gunasekaram, 2016 ONCA 744

Arbitration – jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal – competence-competence – stay of court proceedings

Thomas G. Heintzman O.C., Q.C., FCIArb                                      October 23, 2016

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This article contains Mr. Heintzman’s personal views and does not constitute legal advice. For legal advice, legal counsel should be consulted.

Who Decides If There Is An Appeal From A Court Order Requiring Arbitration: The Parties Or The Court?

One of the first issues that can arise in a dispute is whether arbitration or court proceedings must be pursued. The issue will often arise from a motion by a defendant in the action.  The defendant will bring a motion to stay or dismiss the action on the basis that the dispute must be arbitrated.

What happens when one party wants to appeal the decision which grants the motion to stay or dismiss? Can the parties to the arbitration agreement agree beforehand that there shall, or shall not be, a right of appeal?  That was the issue that Federal Court of Appeal recently considered in Murphy v. Amway Canada Corporation.

Interestingly, the Federal Court of Appeal held that, while the applicable arbitration legislation can preclude an appeal from that decision, the parties cannot, and that the court’s own statutory powers relating to appeals apply despite what the parties have agreed to. This decision could have wider ramifications relating to the parties’ ability to limit or expand the powers of courts relating to arbitration proceedings. According to this decision, the parties may have no right to do so.

Background

Amway is in the business of distributing home, personal care, beauty and health products. It does so through individual distributors who sell the products in their homes or through other persons they recruit. Mr Murphy was an Amway representative in British Columbia.

The agreement between Amway and Mr Murphy was called the Registration Agreement. The Registration Agreement contained a clause requiring any dispute between the parties to be arbitrated. The arbitration clause contained conflicting provisions relating to the arbitration. On the one hand it said that the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 was to govern the “interpretation, enforcement, and any proceedings in any federal or provincial court in Canada.”  On the other hand, it said that Michigan law applied to the arbitration and that the “United States Arbitration Act shall govern the interpretation and enforcement of the arbitration rules and the arbitration proceedings.”  The Rules of Conduct incorporated into the arbitration clause stated that the arbitration would be conducted under the procedures of JAMS (an American-based dispute resolution service) or the American Arbitration Association.

The Murphy v Amway decision:

The Murphy v. Amway decision is most famous for the ruling that a party to an arbitration agreement who asserts a claim under the Competition Act must bring the claim by way of arbitration, and cannot bring the claim in court. Accordingly, Mr. Murphy was precluded from bringing a class action asserting remedies under the Competition Act against Amway.

A judge of the Federal Court stayed Mr. Murphy’s action based upon the arbitration agreement contained in the agreement between Mr Murphy and Amway. Mr. Murphy appealed. A preliminary issue in the Federal Court of Appeal was whether Mr. Murphy had any right to appeal.

Amway argued that Mr. Murphy had no right of appeal from the decision of the Federal Court because, by virtue of the parties’ agreement, the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 applied. Section 7 of that Act provides for a party to an action bringing a motion to stay an action based upon an arbitration agreement. Sub-section 7(6) states that “there is no appeal from the court’s decision.”  Accordingly, Amway argued that the parties had incorporated sub-section 7(6) into their agreement and that subsection precluded Mr. Murphy from appealing.

The Federal Court of Appeal rejected Amway’s submission and held that Mr. Murphy was entitled to appeal.  It held that the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 did not apply to the Registration Agreement as a matter of statute law. It said: “Simply put, we are not bound by the term of that statute.” It so held presumably because the Registration Agreement related to an Amway representative located in British Columbia and a distribution agreement to be performed in British Columbia, and not agreements made in Ontario.  The Federal Court of Appeal accordingly held that the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 only applied by way of agreement, that is, by being incorporated into the Registration Agreement.

The Federal Court of Appeal further held that, simply as an agreement, the arbitration clause in Registration Agreement could not over-ride the Federal Courts Act. That Act provides for an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal from decisions of the Federal Court. In that situation, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Federal Courts Act applied and was not ousted by the parties.

The Federal Court of Appeal distinguished the present situation from that found in a number of provincial trial and appellate courts decisions in which the court had applied sub-section 7(6), or the comparable section in other provinces. In those cases, sub-section 7(6) applied directly to the proceedings because the arbitration was governed by that provincial law. Here, the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 apparently had no application qua statute.

The Federal Court of Appeal also distinguished the decision in Halterm Ltd v. Canada, [1984] F.C.J. No 541. In that case the parties had effectively appointed the Federal Court trial division as the arbitrator of their dispute. In that situation, they were permitted to make a binding and effective agreement that there would be no appeal.

In the result, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the parties had not and could not agree there was no appeal from the judge’s order granting the stay. The Court proceeded to hear the appeal, but dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Federal Court had properly held that the dispute must be determined by arbitration.

Discussion

This decision raises the very interesting public policy issue of where the limits of agreement are in respect of court procedures generally and specifically in relation to arbitration proceedings.

There are a number of sections in the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 that state that there is “no appeal” or limited rights of appeal:

section 7(6) – no appeals with respect to a court decision to stay the action in favour of arbitration;

section 10(2) – no appeals with respect to the court’s appointment of the arbitral tribunal;

section 15(6) – right of appeal only by a removed arbitrator or party with respect to a court decision to remove an arbitrator;

section 16(4) – no appeal from court order appointing a replacement arbitrator; section 17(9) – no appeal from a court order dealing with a jurisdictional objection.

None of these prohibitions on appeals (and particularly the one found in sub-section 7(6) of the Ontario Act) are found in the British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act. This may be the reason why Amway relied upon the Ontario Act.

These prohibitions on appeal exist alongside the provisions in the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure contemplating appeals from the same judges to courts of appeal.  Nevertheless, the latter provisions have been found to be inoperative in the face of the specific prohibition on appeals found in the Arbitration Act, 1991.

Section 3 of the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 says that “the parties to an arbitration agreement may agree, expressly or by implication, to vary or exclude any provision of this Act except” certain specific sections.  None of those non-waivable sections include any of the sections precluding appeals. In that situation may the parties agree that there is an appeal? Presumably the argument would be that the parties cannot create by an agreement an appeal to the courts; and that only the legislature can do that.

If that is so, and if the parties cannot contract in to an appeal, then should the parties be able to contract out of an appeal? Should they be able to contract out of the right in section 45 to seek leave to appeal? Section 45 is not one of the sections that the parties are precluded from waiving and the case law appears to support the entitlement of the parties to contract out of this statutory right to seek leave to appeal. But if a party can do so, should it also be entitled to contract out of the prohibition against appeals in the other sections?

These sections are, of course, one step closer to the arbitration than the situation in Murphy v. Amway. There, the appeal concerned an appeal from one Federal Court judge to the Court of Appeal, that is, an appeal within the court system itself.  So the argument that the parties should not be able to contract out of the appeal rights found in the court statutes may have greater weight. Nevertheless, without citing any authority, the Federal Court of Appeal held that no such agreement can be made, even if the prohibition on appeal is exactly what is found in provincial arbitration statutes. Since the prohibition on appeals is found in provincial statutes, it is hard to say that such a prohibition is contrary to general public policy.  The argument must be made entirely on the basis that the parties cannot, in advance, contract into or out of the provisions of the court system. For example, just as they cannot contract about what are the grounds for appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal (or the Supreme Court of Canada) will be between them, they cannot contract that there will be no such appeal.

The Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA) and the Model Law attached to that statute do not contain any prohibitions on appeals or any right to contract out of the statute. It is interesting to speculate why this is so, in light of the contrasting provisions in the domestic statute.  So far as appeals are concerned, one might conclude that, being an international law intended to be adopted in many countries, the Model Law does not deal with rights of appeal, leaving each country to sort that matter out. In the case of Ontario, however, the effect is to leave wide open rights of appeal in many cases in which there would be no appeal under the domestic statute. So far as contracting out, ICAA and the Model Law are written in a fashion that makes it appear that they are public policy and that the parties cannot contract out of them.

All of the above, and the decision in Murphy v. Amway, may make us re-think the legal principles underlying the waiver or creation of rights relating to appeals and arbitration proceedings.  Is the right to waive or create such rights based on contract law, administrative law, public policy or what, and why?

See Heintzman and Goldsmith on Canadian Building Contracts, 4th ed., chapter 10

Murphy v. Amway Canada Corporation, 2013 FCA 38

Arbitration – Stay of court proceedings – appeals – 

Thomas G. Heintzman O.C., Q.C., FCIArb                                                                                                            March 10, 2013

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Is A Third Party Obliged To Bring Its Claim Under An Arbitration Agreement

A recurring issue in arbitration law is whether a third party is bound to assert his or her claims by way of arbitration, even though the third party is not a party to the arbitration agreement. In Yaworski v. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, the Alberta Court of Appeal recently held that, where a limited partnership was a party to an agreement containing an arbitration clause, the owner of the limited partnership was obliged to arbitrate any disputes arising under the agreement.

Facts

Mr. Yaworski’s limited partnership was an income partner of the law firm Gowling Lafleur Henderson between 2004 and 2009, and Mr. Yaworski worked in the Gowling firm. The agreement between Yaworski LP and the firm terminated in 2009.   Mr. Yaworski then commenced an action for breach of contract.  The action was stayed by a judge of the Albert Court of Queen’s Bench on the ground that the claim must be arbitrated. That decision was upheld in the recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.

Reasons of the Court of Appeal

The Alberta Court of Appeal held that Section 7(1) of the Alberta Arbitration Act and Section 18 of the Alberta Judicature Act authorized the judge of first instance to stay Mr. Yaworski’s action.

Section 7(1) states that “if a party to an arbitration agreement commences a proceeding in a  court  in  respect  of  a  matter  in  dispute  to  be  submitted  to arbitration under the agreement,” the court shall stay the action, subject to certain exceptions.  Section 18(1) contains the court’s equitable jurisdiction to stay any proceedings when the court deems it fit to do so.  In combination, the Court of Appeal held that the court was entitled to stay the action even though it was not brought by the party to the arbitration clause, Yaworski LP.

The Court of Appeal was not prepared to allow Mr. Yaworski to escape the arbitration clause which his limited partnership had entered into. It said:

“However, arbitrations cannot be avoided by simply having a related party commence a lawsuit claiming relief with respect to arbitrable subject matter. In this case Yaworski PC and Gowlings agreed that all disputes between them was to be arbitrated.  In fact the arbitration clause is so broad as to make the issue of whether something is subject to arbitration, arbitrable….

In our view the combination of section 7 of The Arbitration Act, section 18 of the Judicature Act, and  the  court’s  inherent jurisdiction  to  control  its  own  process  to  avoid  unnecessary and duplicitous  proceedings  provided the  chambers judge with jurisdiction to stay Yaworski’s suit pending the arbitration.”

Moreover, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the real claim belonged to Yaworski LP, not Mr. Yaworski.  Therefore, the judge at first instance had been right to stay the action brought by Mr. Yaworski. In this way the proper claim, brought by Yaworski LP, could be asserted by way of arbitration, and if there was any issue about the jurisdiction to hear various claims of Mr. Yaworski and his limited partnership, the arbitrator could address them:

“[22] Our conclusion regarding the continuation of Yaworski PC as a Gowlings partner strongly suggests that at least most of the cause of action against Gowlings advanced by Yaworski in his personal suit actually rests with Yaworski PC. Again if any part of that is outside the purview of the arbitration that question can be determined by the arbitrator.

Discussion

On its face, this is a relatively straightforward decision. It holds the parties to an arbitration clause to their agreement and refuses to allow one party to circumvent the agreement by allowing a person controlling that party from suing personally. The decision does, however, raise a number of issues.

It seems clear that Section 7(1) of the 7(1) of the Arbitration Act would not have empowered the court to grant the stay order unless the party bringing the action can somehow be brought under that subsection. In this circumstance it seems wise to state in arbitration agreements that the parties are executing the agreement as principals, and also on behalf of, and so as to bind, the shareholders, assignees and any other persons asserting facts or issues dealt with in the agreement.

In the absence of such a provision, the party seeking the stay must rely on the general equitable powers under Section 18 of the Judicature Act. One wonders what exactly is the limit of the court’s power under this section. Is the power totally wide open?  Or was the court’s finding that the claim was really one which could only be asserted by Yaworski LP an essential ingredient to the court’s decision to stay the action?

If that is so, then there may be two results.

First, Mr. Yaworski’s action should have been dismissed on the ground that it was brought by a party which had no claim.   This is the effective decision of the Court of Appeal, as it said: “On the record Yaworski cannot make out a proper claim for summary judgment because the cause of action or at least most of it rests with Yaworski PC.”  The rest of the decision may be obiter.

Second, the Court of Appeal is effectively saying that the words “to an arbitration agreement” in Section 7(1) should not be in the subsection. The important words are “in  respect  of  a  matter  in  dispute  to  be  submitted  to arbitration”.  The Court of Appeal appears to be saying that, if the dispute falls within the arbitration agreement, then it should be arbitrated, no matter who brings the claim. That may well be a sensible reading of the subparagraph even though it eliminates four words.

See Heintzman and Goldsmith, Canadian Building Contracts (4th ed.), Chapter 10, Parts 1 and 4

Yaworski v. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, 2013 ABCA 21

Arbitration   –   Stay of Court Proceedings  –  Third parties

Thomas G. Heintzman O.C., Q.C., FCIArb                                                                                                           February 11, 2013

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